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1 Introduction
The most widespread business model in the TV industry is that the TV channels
use a common distributor to reach the viewers. The TV channels set advertising
prices on their own, but delegate to the distributor to determine the prices that
the viewers have to pay. This delegation has the benet that there will be no price
competition between the TV channels in the viewer market; any business-stealing
e¤ects will be internalized by the distributor. In a traditional (one-sided) market,
such inter-rm price coordination would always be benecial to the rms. Other
things equal, it would generate the same joint prot as would be obtainable in a
perfect cartel. We show that this logic does not apply in a two-sided market such
as the TV industry.1
To understand this, note that the distributor does not fully internalize the impact
that high viewer prices have on revenues from the advertising side of the market.
Likewise, the TV stations, in setting their prices to advertisers, do not fully inter-
nalize the e¤ect that the advertising volume has on viewerswillingness to pay for
watching TV. Due to these shortcomings, inter-rm coordination can lead to some
seemingly counter-intuitive results. We nd that when products are becoming less
di¤erentiated, then TV channels compete more ercely and joint industry prots is
increasing. The reason for this surprising result is that the lack of internalization
becomes less serious if the competitive pressure increases. In particular, tougher
competition for viewers leads to a lower advertising volume.
In our analysis, we allow at the outset the distributor and each TV channel to
bargain over a two-part wholesale contract that consists of a xed fee and a unit
wholesale price. Since the viewer price is increasing in the unit wholesale price,
one might expect that the contract could be used to induce rms to set optimal
end-user prices. The problem, however, is that the unit wholesale price a¤ects the
1For a denition of two-sided markets, see Weyl (2010). Examples, in addition to the TV
industry, are other media industries, the payment-card industry, real-estate brokerage, and the
computing industry (computer operating systems, software, game consoles etc.). See Wright (2004)
for a general discussion of the problems associated with applying a one-sided logic to a two-sided
market. Note, however, that he is not discussing the point we are making.
1
relative protability between the two sides of the market, and therefore changes
both the viewer price and the advertising price. It follows that a two-part tari¤ does
not solve the coordination problems. Indeed, we show that joint prots are higher
if the industry can commit to a simple xed fee rather than a two-part wholesale
contract. To see why, note that if a channel receives a higher unit wholesale price
from the distributor, it will optimally reduce the ad volume in order to attract a
larger audience. But then the rival channels are forced to reduce their ad levels
too, and their prots fall. This prot e¤ect is not internalized in a non-cooperative
equilibrium, so unit wholesale prices - and thus viewer prices - are distorted upwards.
Two-part tari¤s consequently lead to ine¢ ciently high prices. Both the industry and
the consumers would be better o¤ if the wholesale contracts instead consisted of a
simple xed fee.
The focus on the TV industry is a timely one, since business models in this
industry are about to change. The presence of the Internet has made it possible for
TV channels to bypass independent distributors and instead sell directly to viewers.
Following up on this technological development, we contrast the market structure
with a common distributor on one side of the market with one where the TV stations
bypass this distributor. In such a situation TV stations set prices non-cooperatively
in both markets. Now, each rm takes into account the interdependence between the
two sides of the market, and thus coordinates its prices (intra-rm coordination). In
other words, a TV station uses both viewer prices and advertising prices in order to
account for the externalities involved between its two groups of consumers. On the
other hand, there is no longer any inter-rm coordination of prices on one side of the
market, since the distributor has disappeared. We show that if TV stationsproducts
are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated in viewersdemand, so that competition for viewers is
su¢ ciently lax, then a regime with intra-rm coordination of prices leads to higher
industry prot than one with inter-rm coordination through the distributor.
Early studies of media markets, such as Steiner (1952), were mostly concerned
with how competition for raising advertising revenue a¤ects media plurality.2 More
2Steiner (1952) and Beebe (1977) discuss how competition a¤ects content, while Spence and
Owen (1977) discuss how nancing of TV stations a¤ects content.
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recent studies such as Rochet and Tirole, (2003, 2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003),
Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong, 2006, Kind et al. (2007, 2009), and Peitz
and Valletti (2008)  emphasize how important it is to take the view that these
industries are two-sided markets, serving both content consumers and advertisers.
However, the media-economics literature does not analyze the kind of coordination
problems that we focus on in this paper. Most models on competition between
TV stations in two-sided markets, for example, either abstract from the role of
distributors, or implicitly assume that these distributors are passive rms with no
inuence on end-user prices. This does not seem to t well with how the TV industry
typically is organized in most countries.
We are not the rst to model a distributor in a media industry, though. No-
tably, Crawford and Cullen (2007) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) discuss a
TV distributors bundling of TV stations. However, the role of advertising on TV
is not studied and therefore the two-sidedness of the TV industry is not taken into
account.
Bel, et al. (2007) is the only other paper we are aware of that discusses the
presence of retailers in a two-sided TV market.3 They focus on a situation where
a rm is vertically integrated, controlling both the distribution and the program
production. They do not compare regimes where either distributors or TV stations
set end-user prices, as we do here.
In the next section we present a model of the TV industry. In Section 3 we
solve this model for the situation where the distributor sets viewer prices, and in
Section 4 we solve it for the situation where a TV station sets both its prices. The
outcomes in those situations are compared in Sections 5. In Section 6 we o¤er some
concluding remarks.
3Vertical integration in a two-sided media market is discussed in Barros, et al. (2004), though.
But there the interest is with respect to integration between platforms and consumers, in particular
between Internet portals and advertisers.
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2 A model of the TV industry
We consider a setting with two TV stations that earn revenues from advertisers and
viewers. The advertising level in the programs provided by TV station i (hereafter
TV i) is denoted Ai, and the level of viewersconsumption of program content is
denoted Ci, i = 1; 2. Advertisers pay ri per unit of advertising on TV i; while
consumers pay pi per unit of program content.
The preferences of a representative viewer is given by the following quadratic
utility function:
U = C1 + C2  
h
(1  s)  C21 + C22+ s2 (C1 + C2)2i ; (1)
where s 2 [0; 1) measures product di¤erentiation: viewers perceive the TV stations
content as independent if s = 0 and as perfect substitutes as s! 1.
This formulation of viewer preferences has two realistic features. First, viewers
do not choose one TV station to watch, but rather consume content from both TV
stations; this is called multihoming and is a feature of consumer behavior common in
the TV industry that distinguishes it from many other two-sided markets. Secondly,
viewerstotal demand across TV stations is not xed, which allows for viewers to
respond to lower prices with an increase in total demand. Neither of these features
is present in the Hotelling-line approach to viewer demand, which is widely used in
analyses of media markets.4
Viewers consumer surplus from watching TV i depends both on the viewer
price pi and on the advertising level Ai. To capture this dependency, we let the
generalized price for watching content on TV i be given by
Gi = pi + Ai;
where  > 0 measures viewersdisutility of being interrupted by ads.5 Consumer
4The merit of using the particular utility function in (1), which is due to Shubik and Levitan
(1980), is that market size does not vary with s; see Motta (2004) for further discussion. Our
qualitative results are invariant to the choice of utility function, though.
5While advertisers obviously benet from the presence of viewers, empirical studies like that of
Wilbur (2008) indicate that the typical viewer has a disutility from the presence of advertising.
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surplus can thus be written as
CS = U   (G1C1 +G2C2) :
We choose the unit size of advertising such that  = 1 and derive viewersdemand
for each media product by solving @CS
@Ci
= 0; i = 1; 2, to obtain:
Ci =
1
2
  (2  s) (Ai + pi)
4 (1  s) +
s (Aj + pj)
4 (1  s) ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (2)
There are a total of n advertisers interested in buying advertising space on the
two TV channels. Let Aik denote advertiser ks advertising level on TV i, such that
Ai =
Pn
k=1Aik. His gross gain from advertising on TV i is naturally increasing in
his advertising level and in the number of viewers exposed to its advertising. We
make it simple by assuming that the gross gain equals AikCi; where  > 0. This
implies that the net gain for advertiser k from advertising on TV equals
k =  (A1kC1 + A2kC2)  (r1A1k + r2A2k) ; (3)
where ri is the advertising price charged by TV channel i for one unit of advertising.
Simultaneous maximization of (3) with respect to A1k and A2k for each k; subject
to (2), yields the demand for advertising at TV channel i:
Ai =
n
n+ 1

(1  pi)  1

[2ri   s(ri   rj)]

(4)
Our interest is in a situation where a downstream distributor buys the right to
transmit programs to viewers. For this he pays TV i a xed fee Fi and a variable
fee fi per unit of program content that viewers watch, i = 1; 2. The distributor
subsequently sets the viewer price pi, while TV i sets the advertising price ri; see
the left panel of Figure 1, where we denote this situation D. Subsequently, we will
compare this with another situation, denoted T , where the TV stations bypass the
distributor and o¤er their content directly to the consumers, i.e., TV i sets both pi
and ri; see the right panel of Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Market structure with and without distributor.
We abstract from any costs for the TV channels and the distributor, except for
access charges. Joint prots for these rms are thus equal to the sum of advertising
revenue and consumer payment:
J =
2X
i=1
(riAi + piCi) : (5)
We make the following assumption to simplify the analysis.
Assumption 1 (i)  = 1; (ii) n = 1.
With  = n = 1, joint prots in (5) are maximized at p = popt  1
2
and
A = Aopt  0 (implying a generalized price Gopt = 1
2
), for any s 2 [0; 1). With  = 1
(or  < 1, for that matter), joint prots are thus maximized when TV is free of
advertising and viewers instead are charged directly through a high p. A larger 
would imply a greater demand for advertising space, since the benet of advertising
now would be higher, implying Aopt > 0 and popt < 1
2
.
A similar e¤ect would come from an increase in the number of advertisers n;
total demand for advertising space goes up, as equation (4) shows. Apart from that,
our qualitative results do not hinge on the simplication introduced in Assumption
1.
6
3 With distributor
As already indicated, our main focus is on situation D, where a distributor buys
the rights to transmit the channelscontents. Specically, it signs contracts (f1; F1)
and (f2; F2) with the two TV stations; fi is a variable fee that TV i charges the
distributor per unit of content a viewer watches, and Fi is a xed fee. The size of
these fees are determined at stage 1, and at stage 2 the distributor sets viewer prices
and the TV channels set advertising prices.
Prots of the distributor and of TV i are now given, respectively, by:
 =
2X
j=1
[(pj   fj)Cj   Fj] ; and (6)
i = riAi + fiCi + Fi; i = 1; 2: (7)
We start out with stage 2 and solve rst di
dri
= 0, i = 1; 2, to nd TV is best
response:
ri =
1  pi + fi   srj
2 (2  s) ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (8)
Equation (8) shows that dri
dpi
< 0. This is essentially because an increase in pi
reduces the viewing time at TV i and thus the willingness among advertisers to pay
for an ad. We also have dri
drj
< 0. This is because channel j will have less ads if it
increases its advertising price, and will thus become more attractive to the viewers.
Thereby channel i becomes relatively less attractive, making it optimal to charge a
lower advertising price. Advertising prices are consequently strategic substitutes, in
contrast to what is typically the case with prices in one-sided markets.6
Next, let us consider the distributors maximization problem. Holding advertis-
ing prices xed, and solving fp1; p2g = argmax, we nd
pi =
1
2
+
fi + (2  s)ri + srj
2
: (9)
Viewer prices are naturally increasing in the distributors marginal costs, so that
we have dpi
dfi
> 0. We further see that viewer prices are increasing in the TV stations
6This is a mechanism that is present also in other models of media markets, see for example
Nilssen and Sørgard (2001), Gabszewicz et al. (2004), and Kind et al. (2009).
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advertising prices: dpi
dri
> 0 and dpi
drj
> 0. This is so because the higher the advertising
prices, the less ads the TV stations will show, and the more attractive they will be
for viewers. Therefore the distributor nds it optimal to charge higher prices.
Equilibrium prices are, from (8) and (9), as follows:7
pi =
1
2
+
1 + (6  s) fi
2 (5  s)  
s (2  s)
4 (5  4s) (5  s) (fi   fj) ; and (10)
ri =
1 + fi
2 (5  s) +
3s
4 (5  4s) (5  s) (fi   fj) : (11)
3.1 Symmetric, exogenous wholesale prices
Below we shall endogenize the wholesale prices, but to see the mechanisms as clearly
as possible it is useful rst to x them at some exogenous values, with f1 = f2 = f
and F1 = F2 = F: In order to ensure non-negative prices and quantities, we assume
that
 1 < f  2  s
8  s: (12)
We shall later see that this holds when contract terms are endogenized.
Equations (10) and (11) yield
p =
1
2
+
1 + (6  s) f
2 (5  s) ; and r =
1 + f
2 (5  s) ; (13)
where we for simplicity have skipped subscripts. We further have
C =
6  s  (4  s) f
8 (5  s) ; and A =
2  s  (8  s) f
4 (5  s) : (14)
The fact that the advertising volume decreases in f induces the distributor to
set a viewer price that increases in f : the higher f is, the less advertising there is
on TV, and the more are viewers willing to pay for TV. Additionally, a higher f
7Note that this holds only when the expression for advertising prices is positive, which requires
that variable fees f1 and f2 are not too di¤erent, in particular that
3s
5 (2  s) <
1 + f1
1 + f2
<
5 (2  s)
3s
:
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means an increase in the distributors marginal cost. This magnies the positive
relationship between p and f further. We therefore have dp
df
> 0:
The distributor chooses viewer prices without taking into consideration that,
since a higher such price reduces viewing time, advertising revenue will fall. The
TV stations likewise choose advertising levels without taking into consideration that
more advertising reduces viewerswillingness to pay for watching TV. These neglec-
tions have the important implication that the generalized viewer price, G = p+A =
1
2
+ 4 s
4(5 s) (1 + f) ; is higher than the one maximizing joint prots: G > G
opt = popt =
1=2; recall the restriction f >  1.
It is now straightforward to verify the following:8
Lemma 1 With distributor. Suppose that wholesale prices are xed and sym-
metric ( f1 = f2 = f). The generalized viewer price and the advertising level are
ine¢ ciently high, but decrease in s ( dG
ds
< 0; dA
ds
< 0). The advertising price and
the viewer price increase in s ( dr
ds
> 0; dp
ds
> 0).
The closer substitutes the TV stationscontents, the more ercely will the sta-
tions compete in having few advertising slots (and the higher will the advertising
prices be).9 This explains why dA
ds
< 0 and dr
ds
> 0: The lower advertising volume in
turn allows the distributor to charge higher viewer prices: dp
ds
> 0. However, since
the generalized price is excessively high (G > Gopt), the distributor increases the
monetary price by less than what the reduced advertising volume would allow for.
Thus, the generalized price decreases in s: dG
ds
< 0.
The distributors prot is found from equations (6), (13), and (14):
 = 2 [(p  f)C   F ] = 1
8

6  s  f (4  s)
5  s
2
  2F; (15)
while each TV stations prot is
 = rA+ fC + F =
(1 + f) [(4  s) (10  s) (1  f)  2fs]
16 (5  s)2 + F: (16)
8We have dAds = 3
dG
ds =   1+f4(5 s)2 < 0, and drds = dpds = 1+f2(5 s)2 > 0.
9This is a core result on the e¤ect of utility-reducing advertising in two-sided markets, see e.g.
Barros et al. (2004) and Anderson and Coate (2005).
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Joint prots thus equal
D = + 2 =
(1 + f) [(40  12s+ s2) (1  f)  2s]
8 (5  s)2 : (17)
We can now show the following:10
Lemma 2 With distributor. Suppose that wholesale prices are xed and sym-
metric ( f1 = f2 = f). Joint industry prots increase in s: d
D
ds
> 0.
Technically, it is not surprising that joint prots increase in s; since G > Gopt
and dG
ds
< 0. It is nonetheless remarkable that stronger competition between the
TV stations benets both the industry and consumers (the latter following trivially
from the fact that consumer surplus is higher the lower is the generalized viewer
price).
3.2 Endogenous wholesale prices
At stage 1 the distributor and the TV stations bargain over the wholesale contracts
(f1; F1) and (f2; F2). This bargaining is done simultaneously and independently be-
tween the distributor and each TV station. Since the two parties in each negotiation
bargain over two-part tari¤s, this bargaining will be e¢ cient, in the sense that the
distributor and TV station i will agree on that variable fee fi that maximizes their
joint prots, taking fj as given. The distributor and TV i thus seek to maximize
+ i = [(pi   fi)Ci + (pj   fj)Cj   Fi   Fj] + [fiCi + riAi + Fi] (18)
= piCi + riAi + (pj   fj)Cj   Fj
with respect to fi.
Simultaneous maximization of (18) for each i gives rise to a symmetric equilib-
rium in which the two variable fees are the same and equal to
fD :=
s (1  s2)
2

100 (1  s)2 + s (18  s) (1  s2) + 4s > 0 for s 2 (0; 1) : (19)
10Using (15) and (16) yields d
D
ds =
(1+f)[11 3s+2fs 14f ]
4(5 s)3 > 0, as long as (12) holds.
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From equation (19) we see that fD ! 0 as s! 0 or s! 1: More generally, fD is a
hump-shaped function of s (dfD
ds
> 0 for s < ~s and dfD
ds
< 0 for s > ~s); as shown in
Figure 2. And fD satises our assumption in (12).
Figure 2: Variabel fees from the distributor to the TV channels.
From Lemma 1 we know that A decreases in s and that p increases in s if the
wholesale price is constant. This relationship is even stronger when dfD
ds
> 0; but it
does not necessarily hold when dfD
ds
< 0. The reason is that a lower wholesale price
tends to make it more protable for a TV station to sell ads and for the distributor
to reduce the viewer price. However, by inserting for (19) into (13) and (14), we can
nonetheless state:
Proposition 1: With distributor. Suppose that f is endogenous.
a) The generalized viewer price monotonically decreases in s, with G > Gopt for
all s.
b) The advertising level is lower in the neighbourhood of s = 1 than at s = 0:
As!1 < As=0.
c) Both the viewer price and the advertising price are higher in the neighbourhood
of s = 1 than at s = 0: ps!1 > ps=0, and rs!1 > rs=0.
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By inserting for (19) into (17) we nd joint prots. Since the generalized price
is ine¢ ciently high, but decreasing in the substitutability between the channels, we
nd, analogously to Lemma 2, that aggregate industry prots are higher the less
di¤erentiated are the TV stationscontents:
Proposition 2: With distributor. Suppose that f is endogenous. Joint industry
prots increase in s: d
D
ds
> 0.
The nding that fD > 0 is somewhat surprising. The fact thatG > Gopt indicates
that the wholesale price should optimally be negative in order to press down the
generalized price. It can be veried that this actually is true: if the distributor
and the two TV stations could negotiate jointly, then they would set f opt < 0.
The reason why fD nonetheless is positive, is the ine¢ ciency that arises in the
negotiations because the parties do not take into account how a change in fi a¤ects
prots for TV j: More specically, a higher fi increases the relative protability of
the viewer market compared to the advertising market for TV i; making it optimal to
reduce its advertising volume (through a higher advertising price). This is negative
for TV station j, who consequently responds by reducing its own advertising volume.
Therefore also TV j loses advertising revenue when fi increases.
So f = f opt < 0 is not a Nash equilibrium. If the distributor and TV 1, say,
agreed on setting f1 = f opt, then the distributor and TV 2 would increase their joint
prot by setting f2 > f opt: But even if f = f opt is not implementable, we might
imagine that the industry is able to commit to using only a xed fee and not a
two-part tari¤ in the wholesale contracts. Putting f = 0 in equation (17) we nd
that aggregate industry prot now is equal to
Df=0 =
(10  s) (4  s)
8 (5  s)2 : (20)
As under a two-part tari¤, the xed fees (F1 and F2) will be used to distribute
prots according to the partiesbargaining power. Comparing joint prots in this
case with what the industry achieves with an arbitrary wholesale price, we nd11
11We have Df=0   D =
f[(40 12s+s2)f+2s]
8(5 s)2 > 0; for f > 0. Since fD > 0 for s 2 (0; 1), the
result follows.
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Proposition 3: With distributor. Joint prots are higher in an equilibrium
with a simple xed-fee wholesale contracts ( fi = 0) than in a Nash equilibrium with
two-part wholesale tari¤s ( fi = fD).
4 No distributor
Now, let us look at the alternative situation, where the TV channels sell directly to
viewers. As argued in the Introduction, this is a scenario that is of increasing rele-
vance as technological developments allow TV stations to use the Internet in order
to bypass distributors. This means that the TV stations decide both advertising and
viewer prices, and that they do not have to pay any distribution fees to downstream
rms (fi  0; Fi  0). The prot level of TV i is then simply equal to
i = piCi + riAi: (21)
Solving @i
@ri
= 0 and @i
@pi
= 0, we nd TV is best responses to TV js prices:
ri =
1  srj
2 (2  s) ; and (22)
pi =
2 (1  s) + spj
2 (2  s) : (23)
Note that advertising prices are strategic substitutes also in this case; best-
response function (22) is qualitatively similar to the one in the previous case, equa-
tion (16). Equation (23) reveals a new aspect, though: the channels compete in
viewer prices when they bypass the distributor, and these prices are strategic com-
plements: dpi
dpj
> 0.
Solving the system of equations in (22) and (23), we obtain equilibrium prices:
r =
1
4  s; and (24)
p =
2 (1  s)
4  3s ; (25)
where subscripts are disregarded for simplicity.
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Equations (2), (4), (24), and (25) further imply:
A =
s2
2 (4  3s) (4  s) ; and (26)
C =
4 (4  3s) + s2
4 (4  3s) (4  s) : (27)
From equations (24) through (27) we can derive:
Proposition 4: No distributor. The monetary and generalized viewer prices
decrease in s ( dp
ds
< 0, dG
ds
< 0), while the advertising volume and the advertising
price increase in s ( dA
ds
> 0, dr
ds
> 0).
Proposition 4 implies that advertising becomes a more important source of rev-
enue the closer substitutes the TV stations are, while the opposite is true for viewer
payments. Note in particular that p ! 0 in the limit as s ! 1; in which case the
industry is unable to raise revenue from the viewer market. This reects the fact
that viewer prices are strategic complements, resulting in marginal-cost pricing in
the limit when the consumers perceive the stationscontents as being perfect sub-
stitutes. The explanation for why the advertising market is still protable even as
s ! 1, is (as noted above) that advertising prices are strategic substitutes. This
is a relatively mild form of competition; see Kind, et al. (2009) for a thorough
discussion.
Joint industry prots, called T , are now simply equal to aggregate prots for
the TV stations:
T = 2 =
[16 (1  s) + s2] (2  s)2
(4  3s)2 (4  s)2 :
5 A comparison
Let us now compare the performance of the two market structures, with and without
a distributor. They behave quite di¤erently, depending on the similarity of the TV
stationscontents. This is illustrated in Figure 3. The left-hand-side panel of the
gure measures industry prot, and we see that bypassing the distributor yields
highest joint prot if and only if s is su¢ ciently low (s < scrit ). To see why, suppose
14
rst that s = 0: Then each TV channel behaves like a monopolist, and it perfectly
balances the externalities across the two sides of the market when the distributor is
not there. Thus, individual prot maximization coincides with industry optimum.
This is not the case when the distributor is there: now the generalized price as
noted above will be too high, since di¤erent rms set prices on the two sides of
the market.
Figure 3: Comparision of market structures.
The problem with the situation without a distributor is the lack of inter-rm price
coordination. Competition between the TV channels will press down viewer prices,
and more so the better substitutes the viewers perceive the channelscontents to be.
Indeed, as s approaches 1, any attempt to charge the viewers for watching TV will
induce the rival to undercut in a Bertrand manner. The same is not true in the other
case, when the distributor is present. Now the distributor internalizes price e¤ects,
taking into account that a lower p1 will reduce the revenue it can raise from TV 2,
and vice versa. The advantage for the industry of internalizing these competitive
externalities is greater than the disadvantage of not being able to internalize the
two-sidedness of the market (the externalities between advertisers and viewers) if
s > scrit . In other words, when competition for viewers is su¢ ciently strong, the
need for intra-rm price coordination is dominated by the need for inter-rm price
coordination.
From these reections it also follows that the relative importance of viewer pay-
ments, 
 = pC
pC+rA
, necessarily must be lower without a distributor than with one, if
s is above a critical value. In the right-hand-side panel of Figure 3 we consequently
have 
T < 
D for s > scrit
 .
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If s > scrit , then total industry prots are higher if the TV stations use a dis-
tributor, even if this intermediate rm does not have any value per se. We have
illustrated this by using a very specic model. However, we believe that our nd-
ings are quite robust to alternative assumptions both on the supply and the demand
side. Specically, no matter how complex the contracts between distributors and
TV channels, a market structure where di¤erent rms set prices on the two sides of
the market can hardly be more e¢ cient than one where the two-sidedness is fully
internalized if we consider a TV channel that o¤ers unique content (which in our
context should be interpreted as s being close to zero). Likewise, it is di¢ cult to see
how channels with non-unique content (high s) should be able to raise higher prots
if they compete head-to-head than if they delegate the prricing decision to a rm
that internalizes the competitive externalities on the viewer side of the market.
6 Concluding remarks
Our analysis illustrates the challenge rms face when they try to coordinate prices
in a two-sided market. It might seem appropriate to let an independent distributor
set viewer prices in order to reduce competition between TV channels in the viewer
market. This could lead to a cartel-like outcome in a one-sided market, but not in
a two-sided market. The problem is that inter-rm price coordination on just one
side of the market prevents intra-rm price coordination. In this paper paper we
show that this might lead to ine¢ ciently high generalized prices, and possibly more
so if the wholesale contracts between a distributor and a TV channel consist of a
two-part tari¤ rather than a simple xed fee.
An alternative could be to combine an independent distributor that coordinates
viewer prices with other ways to take the two-sidedness into account. For example,
the distributorspayment to the TV channels could depend on the TV channels
advertising revenues. However, this does not seem to be a common business model,
at least not in the UK or Scandinavia.12 An interesting research question is why
12See Ofcom (2010), who write the following concerning regulation of the pay TV industry: ..
we proposed to put in place linear, per subscriber prices such that a retailers payments for the
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this is so; could it for instance be due to contractual problems that arise when each
distributor bargains with a large number of TV channels?
Since the generalized viewer prices tends to be too high when the distributor
sets viewer prices, one might imagine that the coordination problem could be over-
come by employing resale price maintenance (RPM), where the TV stations set a
maximum price that the distributor can charge from the viewers.13 But if RPM is
enforced and viewer prices are reduced, this would in turn change the the rivalry be-
tween the TV channels in the advertising market. In that respect the consequences
of RPM is more complex in a two-sided than in a corresponding one-sided market.
We leave this issue for future research.
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